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I. DIRECT CONVEYANCE PRIOR TO AUGUST 29, 1953, AS EFFECTIVE TO
CREATE JOINT TENANCY OR TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
Prior to the enactment of Section 442.025 of the Revised Statutes of
Missouri, effective August 29, 1953, the so-called direct conveyancing act,
the only safe practice in the creation of a joint tenancy or a tenancy by
the entirety where a property owner desired to create the tenancy be-
tween himself and anothers was to convey through a straw party instead
of directly. The basic problem was the dogma that a person could not
convey to himself. If X conveyed to H[usband] in fee, and thereafter H
conveyed to H and W[ife] in fee as tenants by the entirety, the orthodox
view was that H and W were tenants in common, not tenants by the
entirety, because H got his title from X at an earlier time, W got her
title from H at a later time, and that there was no unity of title to satisfy
that requirement of the four unities of rule.' Prior to 1954 Missouri had
no decision which either held or stated by way of dictum that Missouri
would reject the highly technical requirements of the common law and
would permit a direct conveyance.
One of the original proposed title examination standards presented in
1946 for the consideration of the Title Examination Standards Commit-
tee (now a part of the Real Property Committee) of The Missouri Bar
provided in rough draft: "Conveyance by record owner directly to him-
self or herself and spouse, containing recital that it is made for the purpose
of creating a tenancy by the entirety, should be accepted." 2 Members of
*This article contains a discussion of selected 1960 and 1961 Missouri court
decisions reported in volumes 335-349, South Western Reporter, Second Series.
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri; B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. Eckhardt & Peterson, Possessory Estates, Future Interests and Con-
veyances in Missouri, § 39 n. 33, § 40, 23 V.A.M.S. 36-39 (1952).
2. Title Examination Standards Committee, Final Report 1947-48, 4 J. Mo.
B. 255 col. 1, 256 col. 1 (1948).
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the committee were generally in agreement that such a title was good in
fact (that considering the high quality of the judges of the Missouri
Supreme Court and the trend in real property decisions it was almost
inconceivable that the court for purely technical reasons would fail to
give effect to a grantor's clear expression of intention), but the majority
of the committee were of the opinion that there was enough possibility
of the issue being litigated that such a title was unmarketable and that a
title examination standard as proposed would be neither safe nor appro-
priate.3 Consequently the proposed standard was not adopted.
The committee then prepared and supported the legislation which
became section 442.025, effective August 29, 1953, which did not purport to
affect prior conveyances. This legislation eliminated most of the problems
as to conveyances within its scope. Title Examination Standard No. 28 and
the extensive comment thereto4 cover the basic problems as to the scope
and operation of the statute but with several important caveats. 5
The effectiveness of a direct conveyance made prior to August 29, 1953,
to create a joint tenancy or a tenancy by the entirety has finally been
settled by Kluck v. Metsger6 which is analyzed in detail infra. This case was
foreshadowed in 1954 by Creek v. Union Nat'l Bank,7 a case overlooked
by the law reviews, probably because the summary of the issues preced-
ing the headnotes to the report is confined to the issues of mental com-
petency and undue influence and gives no hint as to the direct conveyanc-
ing issue.
The Creek case states that where two sisters, S1 and S2, were benefi-
3. Title Examination Standards Committee, Report 1953-54, 10 J. Mo. B.
166 col. 1, 168 col. 2 (1954), where the tentative draft of Title Examination
Standard No. 28 and comment thereto includes as Comment (h) a discussion
of direct conveyances before Aug. 29, 1953. This part of the comment was dropped
in the final draft, 23 V.A.M.S. (Supp.) ch. 442 app., as not essential, the standard
itself covering only conveyances effective on and after Aug. 29, 1953.
4. 23 V.A.M.S. (Supp.) ch. 442 app.
5. Ibid. Comment (e) is concerned with a conveyance by one spouse who
owns in severalty to the other spouse in severalty. Comment (f) is concerned with
the use of a deed not only to effect partition but also by the same deed to create
a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety.
In the first type of case, a conveyance by one spouse to the other in severalty,
the safe practice is to convey through a straw.
In the second type of case, partition, the safe practice is to effect partition,
and then by a separate deed create the joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety.
6. 349 S.W.2d 919 (Mo. 1961).
7. 266 S.W.2d 737 (Mo. 1954).
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ciaries as tenants in common of a trust of personal property, and there-
after Si and S2 joined in a transfer to themselves, Si and S2, "as tenants
by the entirety [sic] with right of survivorship", they became joint ten-
ants, even though the transfer did not go through a straw party.s It is
doubtful whether this was a significant issue in the case, and it could be
argued that there was unity of title or at least a reasonable facsimile
thereof as well as the other three unities. In any event, a transfer of
personal property by two tenants in common to themselves as joint ten-
ants is not necessarily a controlling precedent in a case where a father
conveys real estate to father and son in fee in joint tenancy. The really
significant thing in the opinion by Bohling, C., in the Creek case is the
expression of the court's attitude that clear intention should override
purely formalistic rules based on arbitrary distinctions and niceties of the
feudal common law, and that there is no good reason for going through
a straw party.
Kluck v. Metsger,9 without benefit of statute, holds that where the
intention is clear a direct conveyance by H[usband] to H and W[ife] is
effective to create a tenancy by the entirety. H owned Blackacre, and in
1943 he conveyed Blackacre by warranty deed, the significant provisions
of which were as follows. The premises named H as party of the first
part and W as party of the second part. The granting clause ran to "the
party of the second part [W], a co-tenancy by the Entirety with said
party of the first part [H]". Following the description was a special clause:
"The said party of the first part reserving unto himself a co-tenancy by
the entirety with said party of the second part in and to said premises;
the intention of this deed being to vest fee simple title to said premises
in [H] and [W], husband and wife, by the entirety with right of survivor-
ship." The habendum ran to "the said party of the second part [W], as co-
tenant by the entirety with right of survivorship." The opinion does not set
out the warranty clause, but in view of the fact that the court quoted certain
parts of the deed with special recitals, it is probable that the warranty
clause had no special recital and ran simply to "the party of the second
part and her heirs and assigns forever." H died intestate, survived by
W and by H's children by a former marriage. Thereafter W quitclaimed
to her son (apparently by a former marriage), who died intestate sur-
8. See id. at 749-50, and especially id. at 752, for a discussion of this prob-
lem.
9. Supra note 6.
19621
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vived by his widow and issue. The litigation to try and determine title
was between the heirs at law of H, who contended that the 1943 deed
gave W no interest whatsoever, and the successors in title to W, who
claimed the entire fee.
It would seem that it could not be contended with any hope of suc-
cess that the 1943 deed was without any effect whatsoever. The real prob-
lem would seem to be whether it was effective to create a tenancy by
the entirety in the fee with W surviving to the whole, or whether on
orthodox common law principles it gave W only an undivided one-half
as tenant in common, leaving one-half in H as a tenant in common.
The court in an incisive opinion by Hyde, J., held that the 1943 deed
effectively created a tenancy by the entirety, and that W survived to the
whole, concluding:
Therefore, we should hold that a deed creates the interest which
the parties clearly intended it to create, without regard to purely
formalistic practices, arbitrary distinctions and niceties derived
from the feudal common law, in the absence of contrary public
policy or prohibitory legislation. Sec. 442.025 RSMo 1959 (adopted
1953, Laws 1953, p. 615,) V.A.M.S., as well as our rule of con-
struction in accordance with the grantor's intent, indicates a public
policy in accord with this view and with our ruling in Creek v.
Union National Bank, supra.10
For several reasons Kluzck v. Metsger is a case of great authority,
in addition to the eminence of the jurist who wrote the opinion. First, it
is a square holding. Second, it is a hard case but nevertheless the court
made good law; the holding excludes the natural objects of H's bounty,
the blood issue of H who was the original source of the property, and
gives the property to the widow and descendants of a stepchild of H.
Third, Division No. 1 in the Kluck case expressly approves what Division
No. 2 said in the Creek case; while neither opinion was by the court en
banc, both divisions have clearly expressed themselves and are in accord.
10. 349 S.W.2d at 921. Survivorship was effected as an ordinary incident of
a tenancy by the entirety in fee. There is no indication whatsoever that survivorship
was effected by construing the limitation as creating a contingent remainder in
the whole in the survivor. On the Hunter v. Hunter type of construction and its
limited area of operation, see Eckhardt, Property Law in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. Rv.
456-69 (1959) (Joint Tenancies and Tenancies by the Entirety-Words of Sur-
vivorship-Joint Tenancy or Tenancy by the Entirety in Fee, or "Joint" Life
Estate with Contingent Remainder in Fee in Survivor); Eckhardt, Property Law
in Missouri, 25 Mo. L. REv. 390 (1960) (Hunter v. Hunter Revisited).
[Vol. 27
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Fourth, the conveyance in issue was so ineptly drawn that it was not
even a clean direct conveyance from H to H and W in fee as tenants by
the entirety, but was a conveyance with a reservation with clear intention;
if such a conveyance was effective to create a tenancy by the entirety,
a fortiori a clean direct conveyance would be effective.
What is the significance of the Kiuck case to title examiners with
reference to conveyances prior to August 29, 1953? In my opinion a title
examiner now can pass as marketable and without comment a title where
the only question is as to the effectiveness of a direct conveyance to
create a tenancy by the entirety and where a tenancy by the entirety is
expressly indicated. I have not yet reached any firm conclusion as to
whether a title examiner should pass a direct conveyance, H to H and W
in fee, where the entireties estate depends on the pre'sumption in Section
442.450 of the 1959 Revised Statutes of Missouri. In principle it would
seem that a title examiner should pass any direct conveyance which he
would pass if title had gone through a straw. The Kluck case was not
really concerned with the sufficiency of a limitation to create a tenancy
by the entirety, but with the technical problem whether one must convey
through a straw. I believe this would be a proper subject for the Real
Property Committee of The Missouri Bar to consider for a new title ex-
amination standard.
Although the Kluck case was concerned with the creation of a tenancy
by the entirety, the principle of the case is fully and equally applicable to a
direct conveyance purporting to create a joint tenancy; in addition there is
the dictum in the Creek case which was concerned with the creation of a
joint tenancy in personal property. I would pass a pre-1953 conveyance of
the type, Father to Father and Son in fee in joint tenancy, without waiting
for a definitive decision on the point.
II. JOINT TENANcY-SUFFICIENCY OF WORDS TO CREATE
A. Source of Section 442.450, RSMo 1959
The earliest legislation in Missouri concerning joint tenancies was in
1816 and prohibited joint tenancies, or at least prohibited their really im-
portant incident: "The doctrine of survivorship in cases of joint tenants
shall never be allowed, in this territory.-11 In 1825 joint tenancies were per-
11. Act Jan. 19, 1816, 1 Mo. Terr. Laws § 2, at 436 (1804-1824).
1962]
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mitted, but a transfer of real property to two or more persons created a
tenancy in common unless expressly declared to pass "not in tenancy in
common, but in joint tenancy."' 2 In 1835 the present terminology of Sec-
tion 442.450 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri was adopted, that a trans-
fer of real property to two or more persons created a tenancy in common
"unless expressly declared in such grant, or devise, to be in joint tenancy."'3
B. Sufflciency of Words to Create Joint Tenancy
What words are sufficient to expressly declare a transfer to be "in
joint tenancy" has given rise to a substantial amount of litigation in Mis-
souri and elsewhere. The problem needs to be approached on two levels:
first, in litigation what express declaration will be held to satisfy section
442.450; and second, what express declaration so clearly satisfies the statute
that title is marketable.
Powers v. Buckowitz,14 a decision by the Missouri Supreme Court en
banc, is an extremely important holding as to what express declaration will
be held in litigation to satisfy the statute, not only for its narrow holding
on the limitation used in the case but also for its discussion of several vari-
ants. The able opinion was by Barrett, C.; Westhues, J., dissented without
opinion.
Powers v. Bwckowitz was concerned with a 1952 conveyance through a
straw party whereby Mother conveyed to Straw in fee, and Straw quit-
claimed to Mother and Daughter by the deed in question. The premises
of the deed named Mother and Daughter "as tenants by entirety [sic] and
to the survivor of them." The granting clause ran "unto the said parties of
the second part, as tenants by entirety [sic] and to the survivor of them."
The habendum ran to the parties of the second part "as tenants by the en-
tirety [sic] or survivor of them and to their heirs and assigns forever." Be-
ing a quitclaim deed there was no warranty clause and no opportunity for
another variation of the recital. It is difficult to boil down the limitation to
one hypothetical form because the scrivener (a layman) was not consistent,
the first two recitals being identical and the third recital differing in the
several respects indicated by italics supplied.
12. § 3, at 216, RSMo 1825. There was an exception in this act in the case
of transfers to executors or trustees, the exception being carried forward through
successive amendments into the present § 442.450, RSMo 1959.
The exception in case of a transfer to a husband and wife with resultant
tenancy by the entirety was first expressed in § 12, at 443, RSMo 1865.
13. § 6, at 119, RSMo 1835.
14. 347 S.W.2d 174 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
[Vol. 27
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Thereafter in 1952 Mother married the plaintiff, and in 1957 Mother
died intestate survived by the plaintiff, her widower, and by her daughter,
the other grantee in the 1952 deed. The widower's theory was that the 1952
deed created a tenancy in common, that Mother died owning an undivided
one-half in fee, and that as widower he inherited from Mother one-half of
one-half, or one-fourth of the whole. Daughter's theory was that the 1952
deed created a joint tenancy in fee with the incident of survivorship, and
that she survived to the whole.
The problem was whether the language in the deed "expressly declared"
the interest "to be in joint tenancy" to satisfy the requirement of section
442.450. The problem was made much more difficult by reason of the prior
dictum by the court en banc in State ex rel. Aslhauer v. Hostetter' that a
devise to two daughters "as tenants by the entirety" created a tenancy in
common in fee. In the Aslhauer case the court said:
But Sec. [442.450] makes it plain that a joint tenancy can be
created in grantees or devisees, who are not executors, trustees or
husband and wife, in one way only, and that is to expressly say so,
by using the term "joint tenancy."'lr
The statement was dictum because the suit was by one tenant against the
other for partition, and partition will be decreed as of course in the case
of joint tenancies as well as tenancies in common.1 7
Notwithstanding the dictum in the Asluauer case, the court en banc
in Powers v. Buckowitz held the deed in question created a joint tenancy
in fee with its incident of survivorship:
In summary, it was the manifest intention of the parties to create
an estate in fee simple with right of survivorship in mother and
daughter, and for the reasons indicated this particular instrument
has "expressly declared" (V.A.M.S. § 442.450) the fact 1 8
To B and C in fee as tenants by tire entirety. This essentially is the
limitation in Powers v. Buckowitz but with the survivorship recital omitted.
Powers v. Buckowitz states by way of dictum that such a limitation does
not create a joint tenancy, saying: ". . this phrase standing alone is in-
15. 344 Mo. 665, 670, 127 S.W.2d 697, 699 (1939) (en banc).
16. Id. at 670, 127 S.W.2d at 699.
17. See Gunn, 5 Mo. L. REv. 114-18 (1940) (Property-Estates-Limitation
Sufficient to Create Joint Tenancy) for an able analysis of the Astuker case and its
ramifications.
18. 347 S.W.2d at 176.
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sufficient to create a joint tenancy with the right of survivorship ... "-
The express recital of survivorship in the actual limitation in Powers v.
Buckowitz was deemed significant as "an affirmative expression of inten-
tion" to create a joint tenancy.
To B and C in fee jointly. The court in Powers v. Buckowitz properly
states by way of dictum that such a limitation would create only a tenancy
in common, the word "jointly" being equivocal.2 0 In popular usage all con-
current interests are held "jointly" and the word "jointly" is almost as
indicative of a tenancy in common as it is of a joint tenancy.
C. Proper Limitation of a Joint Tenancy
How should a joint tenancy in fee be limited? It is believed that the
basic form of the limitation should be: "to B and C in fee as joint tenants
and not as tenants in common." A variant, "to B and C in fee in joint
tenancy and not in tenancy in common," meets the literal requirement of
section 442.450 that the interest be expressly declared to be "in joint ten-
ancy," but is somewhat awkward, and the phrase "as joint tenants" in lieu
of "in joint tenancy" is ordinarily used by lawyers and has been approved in
at least two cases as a literal compliance with section 442.450.21
Since 1835 it has not been necessary to negative a tenancy in common
by an express recital, 22 but the inclusion of the words "and not as tenants
in common" shows clearly that the draftsman knows the difference between
these two types of concurrent interests, and should be included as a routine
matter.
-23
Any express recital of survivorship should be avoided, in view of
Hunter v. Hunter.2 '
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. McClendon v. Johnson, 337 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo. 1960); Powers v. Bucko-
witz, supra note 14, at 176.
22. Supra notes 12 and 13.
23. Where there is to be a joint tenancy between husband and wife, the
draftsman should recite "and not as tenants in common and not as tenants by the
entirety." See PErERsoN & ECKHARDT, MIssouRi 'LEGAL FORMS § 723 (1960).
PErERsoN & ECKHARDr, op. cit., §§ 721-31, covers various limitations of con-
current interests. Section 701 shows how to modify a printed form by striking out
and interlining so that the instrument will be completely consistent on its face.
24. 320 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1959), exhaustively discussed in Eckhardt, Property
Law in Missouri, 24 Mo. L. REv. 456-69 (1959).
That the construction in the Hunter case is being confined to its proper
bounds, see McClendon v. Johnson, supra note 21, analyzed in Eckhardt, Property
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